Constituitional Rights of the Insane on Death Row, The--Eighth Amendment:  Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986) by Pastroff, Sanford M.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 77 | Issue 3 Article 13
1987
Constituitional Rights of the Insane on Death Row,
The--Eighth Amendment: Ford v. Wainwright, 106
S. Ct. 2595 (1986)
Sanford M. Pastroff
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Sanford M. Pastroff, Constituitional Rights of the Insane on Death Row, The--Eighth Amendment: Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct.
2595 (1986), 77 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 844 (1986)
0091-4169/86/7703-844
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAw & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 77, No. 3
Copyright © 1986 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in I'S.A.
EIGHTH AMENDMENT-THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
INSANE ON DEATH ROW
Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Supreme Court had previously dealt with the cir-
cumstances of purportedly insane prisoners on death row,' the
Court had never squarely addressed the issue of the constitutional
rights of condemned prisoners. In Ford v. Wainwright,2 the Court
held for the first time that the eighth amendment 3 prohibits the exe-
cution of insane prisoners. Basing their holding upon the fact that
at common law the execution of the insane was clearly prohibited,
and the fact that no state currently permits such executions, a plu-
rality of the Court held that prisoners sentenced to death have a
constitutional right not to be executed if they are insane at the time
of execution.4 As a result of this holding, the plurality concluded
that the Florida procedures for the determination of a prisoner's
sanity did not afford Alvin Ford the fair hearing necessary to pre-
vent habeas corpus review in federal court.5
The recognition of the constitutional rights of insane prisoners
in Ford is significant because it requires that state procedures for the
determination of sanity and for dealing with allegations of insanity
satisfy due process standards. Heretofore, the stay of the execution
of an insane prisoner was viewed as an act of mercy by the state,
such that the state was required only to provide minimal protections
to prisoners alleging that they were insane. Now that insane prison-
ers have a constitutional right not to be executed, however, states
I Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9
(1950); Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 (1948); Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897); see
infra notes 6-25 and accompanying text.
2 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
3 The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
4 106 S. Ct. at 2602.
5 Id. at 2605. The fourteenth amendment provides in relevant part that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ......
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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must provide safeguards that comport with this new due process
right. Thus, Ford will have a major impact on state procedures for
the disposition of insanity claims by condemned prisoners.
While the reasoning of the Court in Ford is straightforward and
a logical extension of the Court's recent eighth amendment juris-
prudence, there are still three inherent flaws in the decision. First,
the Court did not identify the procedures required by due process
to protect the new constitutional right that the holding created.
Second, the Court gave no indication of what the appropriate test
for insanity should be for a condemned prisoner. Finally, the Court
failed to specify the rationale for the exemption of insane prisoners
from execution. This Note examines these issues and identifies sev-
eral factors that may assist in the interpretation of existing proce-
dures for the disposition of insanity claims in light of the Court's
holding.
II. PRIOR SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The United States Supreme Court has considered four previous
cases involving prisoners who alleged they were mentally incompe-
tent at the time of their scheduled executions. In none of these in-
stances, however, did the Court squarely address the
constitutionality of executing the insane.
The Court first addressed an insanity claim by a death row in-
mate in Nobles v. Georgia6 in 1897. In Nobles, the Supreme Court was
called to resolve the issue of whether a defendant, upon the mere
suggestion of present insanity, had a due process right to a full jury
trial on the issue of his fitness to be executed. The Court held that
the condemned inmate did not have an absolute entitlement to a
jury trial and that the procedures of the state of Georgia satisfied the
minimal requirements of due process.7 Noting that at common law
the rule against the execution of the insane was a matter of judicial
discretion, the Court wrote that the manner in which the question of
insanity should be resolved was a matter for legislative regulation.,
The Court refused to recognize a constitutional right9 not to be exe-
6 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
7 Id. Georgia's procedure provided that if a condemned prisoner claimed to be in-
sane, the sheriff was required to summon a jury to determine his sanity. If the prisoner
were found insane, his execution was required to be stayed. Nobles, 168 U.S. at 402
(citing GA. CODE ANN. § 4666 (1895)).
8 Id. at 409.
9 In Nobles, the petitioner contended that his right not to be executed was guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment. At that time, the eighth amendment was not consid-
ered by the Court to apply to the states. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962)(extending the eighth amendment's protections to state procedures).
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cuted, and specified that its holding addressed only the narrow issue
of whether a full jury trial was required to decide a claim of
insanity.' 0
The Supreme Court did not hear another case involving an al-
legedly insane, condemned convict for fifty-three years. In Phyle v.
Duffy," the Court granted certiorari to decide the questions of
whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment for-
bade the execution of the insane and whether a person could be
executed upon an unreviewable ex parte determination of sanity. Be-
cause the petitioner in that case had not exhausted his state reme-
dies, however, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the
petition for habeas corpus and therefore dismissed the writ of
certiorari. 12
Nonetheless, Phyle is significant because the Court stated, albeit
as dicta, that Nobles did not control the petitioner's contentions.
13
The Court carefully pointed out that Nobles decided a very narrow
issue and did not stand for the proposition that a state could consti-
tutionally allow a single individual to make an ex parte determination
of sanity without judicial supervision or review.
14
Although the Court in Phyle did not reach the issue of the con-
stitutionality of executing the insane, the Court faced the issue two
years later in Solesbee v. Balkcom. 15 In Solesbee, the Court upheld the
state of Georgia's procedures for the disposition of condemned
prisoners' insanity claims. Georgia's procedure 16 provided that the
Governor decide whether or not to commit a prisoner to a mental
10 168 U.S. at 409. The Court did not address the issue of the level of protection
required by due process.
11 334 U.S. 431 (1948).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 437. "We do not think that either the actual holding or what was said in the
opinion in [Nobles] ... would necessarily require a rejection of the contentions made
here against the California procedures." Id.
14 Id. at 438. In fact, on remand, the Supreme Court of California commented that
the United States Supreme Court's opinion "intimat[ed] that due process of law requires
some sort of judicial hearing upon the issue of the present sanity of a person under
sentence of death." Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal. 2d 144, 151-52, 208 P.2d 668, 672 (1949).
15 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
16 The Georgia procedure at that time provided:
Upon satisfactory evidence being offered to the Governor that the person convicted
of a capital offense has become insane subsequent to his conviction, the Governor
may, within his discretion, have said person examined by such expert physicians as
the Governor may choose; and said physicians shall report to the Governor the re-
sult of their investigation; and the Governor may, if he shall determine that the
person convicted has become insane, have the power of committing him to the Mil-
ledgeville State Hospital until his sanity shall have been restored, as determined by
laws now in force ....
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2602 (1903), quoted in Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 10 n.l.
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health facility with the aid of such experts as he deemed necessary.
Although the petitioner argued that the Georgia procedure violated
due process because it did not afford the prisoner an opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses and provide evidence in an adversarial
hearing, the Court was not persuaded that the procedure was
defective.
The Court noted that the petitioner had not shown any refusal
by the Governor to consider information submitted by the peti-
tioner. Thus, Solesbee may have been decided differently had there
been a showing that the petitioner was denied an opportunity to be
heard. 17 Moreover, like Nobles, the holding in Solesbee warrants only
limited emphasis because the Court declined to address the issue of
whether the execution of the insane is "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" despite the opportunity to decide the issue.18 Again, the
Court explicitly warned that it only intended its ruling to pass upon
the specific procedures challenged in the case at bar. 19
Nevertheless, Solesbee does deserve considerable attention be-
cause of the strong dissent filed by Justice Frankfurter. Justice
Frankfurter argued for the first time that the Constitution prohibits
the execution of insane prisoners. 20 Justice Frankfurter thoroughly
examined the common law rule against the execution of the insane
and pointed out that no state permitted the execution of insane per-
sons. 21 As a result, he concluded that an insane convict has a consti-
tutional right not to be executed because the fourteenth
amendment protects rights that are "deeply rooted in our common
heritage." 22
Eight years after Solesbee, the Supreme Court considered an-
other insanity claim by a death row inmate. In Caritativo v. Califor-
nia,23 a condemned prisoner challenged a California law which only
permitted a prison warden to take the first step in instituting court
proceedings for the determination of a condemned prisoner's san-
ity. The Court, citing Solesbee, upheld the lower court's approval of
17 Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 13. In Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958), see infra
notes 23-25 and accompanying text, Justice Frankfurter pointed out that "[i]t did not
appear in [Solesbee] whether, in exercising this function, the governor had declined to
hear statements on the defendant's behalf." Id. at 557 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
18 Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 11.
19 Id.
20 ME at 21 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)("In view of the Due Process Clause it is not
for the State to say: 'I choose not to take life if a man under sentence becomes insane.'
The Due Process Clause says to a State: 'Thou shalt not.' ").
21 See infra note 64.
22 Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 20 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
23 357 U.S. 549 (1958).
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the procedure in a one sentence per curiam opinion.24 Nonetheless,
three Justices, led by Justice Frankfurter, dissented from the Court's
opinion. Justice Frankfurter argued, as he had in Solesbee, that the
fourteenth amendment prohibits the execution of the insane 25 and
severely criticized the California procedure because it afforded a
prisoner the opportunity to be heard only at the discretion of the
warden.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF FORD
On July 21, 1974, Alvin Bernard Ford participated in an armed
robbery in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. During the robbery Ford fa-
tally shot a policeman in the back of the head after the officer was
wounded and helpless.26 Ajury convicted Ford of first-degree mur-
der and he was subsequently sentenced to death.27 No allegations
of insanity were made at the time of his offense, trial, or sentenc-
ing.28 In early 1982, however, Ford began to behave abnormally. 29
Thus, when the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals finally denied
Ford's appeal of his conviction 30 in October of 1983, Ford invoked
the procedures of Florida Statute section 922.0731 for the determi-
24 Id. at 550.
25 This was actually unnecessary because the statutory law of California clearly for-
bade the execution of insane persons. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3703 (West 1982).
26 Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
27 Id.
28 106 S. Ct. at 2598.
29 Id. at 2598-99. It appears that Ford's perception of reality became increasingly
distorted. He started to believe that a large group of people, including the Ku Klux
Klan and the prison guards, among others, was conspiring against him. He then de-
cided that the conspirators were holding hostages in the prison, including his family and
several government leaders. Ford was examined for 14 months by a psychiatrist en-
gaged by his counsel. At the end of this time, the psychiatrist concluded that Ford had a
severe mental disorder, but Ford refused to see him further, believing that the psychia-
trist had joined in the plot against him. Ford eventually came to believe that he could
not be executed because he owned the prisons and could control the governor through
the use of "mind waves." Id.
30 Ford's case has a long history outside of the insanity issue. After Ford's conviction
was affirmed, Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980),
Ford, along with other death row inmates, petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for
relief alleging that that court's procedure for review of capital cases was improper.
Ford's petition was denied, Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1000 (1981). Ford then sought and was denied post-conviction relief in state court.
Ford v. State, 407 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1981). After this, Ford filed a motion for habeas
corpus in federal court but was again denied. Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (1 1th
Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983). Ford did not advance his claim of in-
sanity until all of these challenges proved to be unsuccessful.
31 Florida Stat. Ann. § 922.07 (West 1985) provides in relevant part:
(1) When the Governor is informed that a person under sentence of death may be
insane, he shall stay execution of the sentence and appoint a commission of three psy-
chiatrists to examine the convicted person. The Governor shall notify the psychia-
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nation of his sanity.
As required by statute, the Governor of Florida appointed a
panel of three psychiatrists to evaluate Ford's mental condition.
32
By order of the Governor, however, Ford's attorneys were not per-
mitted to cross-examine the psychiatrists or act in any other adver-
sarial capacity.33 The psychiatrists examined Ford simultaneously
during a single thirty minute interview.3 4 Although each produced a
different diagnosis, all of the psychiatrists concluded that Ford had
"the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty
and the reasons why it was imposed upon him." 35 After the psychi-
atric examinations, Ford's attorneys tried to submit further informa-
tion to the Governor, including the report of a fourth psychiatrist
who had thoroughly examined Ford and found him to be insane.3 6
The Governor's office, however, refused to inform Ford's counsel
whether the additional psychiatric information would be consid-
ered.37 Subsequently, the Governor signed a death warrant without
an explanation or statement of his findings.
38
Ford's counsel sought a competency hearing in state court, but
the hearing was denied.39 Ford's attorneys then filed a petition for
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, again seeking an evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine Ford's mental competency. The court denied the petition
without a hearing. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals stayed Ford's execution and granted a certificate of probable
cause, noting that the Supreme Court had never decided whether
the execution of the insane violated the eighth amendment.40 The
trists in writing that they are to examine the convicted person to determine whether
he understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is to be im-
posed upon him. The examination of the convicted person shall take place with all
three psychiatrists present at the same time. Counsel for the convicted person and
the state attorney may be present at the examination. If the convicted person does
not have counsel, the court that imposed the sentence shall appoint counsel to rep-
resent him. (2) After receiving the report of the commission, if the Governor de-
cides that the convicted person has the mental capacity to understand the nature of
the death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed upon him, he shall issue a
warrant to the warden directing him to execute the sentence at a time designated in
the warrant.
Id. (emphasis added).
32 106 S. Ct. at 2599.
3 Id. at 2604; see infra note 75.
34 Id. at 2599.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 2604.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Ford v. State, 451 So. 2d 471, 475 (Fla. 1984).
40 Ford v. Strickland, 734 F.2d 538 (11 th Cir. 1984).
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State of Florida subsequently attempted to have the stay of execu-
tion vacated, but the Supreme Court denied the application to va-
cate the stay.
41
The three member panel of the court of appeals then ruled on
the constitutionality of the execution of the insane, holding that
Ford was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 42 Nonetheless, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that it would have had "considerable diffi-
culty" with the case absent what it felt was the binding authority of
Solesbee.43 In a dissenting opinion very similar to the Supreme
Court's ultimate holding in Ford, one judge argued that Solesbee no
longer had precedential value due to recent changes in the Supreme
Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence.
44
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In a seven to two plurality decision, the Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals and held that the procedures used by the
State of Florida violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.45 More significantly, a five-justice majority also found
that the execution of insane persons constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment forbidden by the eighth amendment.46
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Powell
and Stevens, announced the judgment of the Court. He concluded
that the eighth amendment forbids the execution of the insane.47 In
the first two parts of his opinion, Justice Marshall examined the is-
sue of the execution of insane prisoners within the framework of the
Court's recent decisions involving the eighth amendment. Justice
Marshall began by stating that the Court's decision in Solesbee was
not controlling because in that case the Court never reached the
issue of the eighth amendment rights of condemned prisoners. 48
He also noted that the Court's other decisions dealing with the in-
41 Wainwright v. Ford, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984). In his concurrence to the order of the
court, Justice Powell stated that "[t]his Court has never determined whether the Consti-
tution prohibits execution of a criminal defendant who currently is insane ..... Id. at
1221.
42 Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526 (11 th Cir. 1985).
43 Id. at 528.
44 Id. at 534 (Clark, J., dissenting).
45 Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2606.
46 Id. at 2602.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 2600.
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sanity issue49 were inapplicable because they did not involve the
eighth amendment. 50 Thus, Justice Marshall found that Ford
presented a case of first impression on the eighth amendment
issue. 51
Justice Marshall began his analysis of the eighth amendment by
pointing out that the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment includes at least those punishments prohibited at the
time the Bill of Rights was adopted.52 He then set forth the Court's
most recent eighth amendment test: that a particular punishment
must be evaluated against the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society" 53 and must "comport...
with the fundamental human dignity that the Amendment
protects." 5
4
Justice Marshall initiated his evaluation of the societal standards
pertaining to the rule against the execution of the insane by investi-
gating the common law authority for the rule,55 much as Justice
Frankfurter did in his dissent in Solesbee. Justice Marshall presented
the various reasons which have been used to explain the rule: 1) the
execution of the insane is an offense against humanity; 56 2) the con-
demned might be able to think of a reason why he should not be
executed were he not insane;57 3) such an execution has no deter-
rent value because it would not serve as an example to others;58 4) it
would offend religious charity to execute someone before he can
prepare himself for another world;59 and 5) execution serves no
purpose because insanity is punishment in itself.60 In addition, Jus-
49 See supra notes 6-25 and accompanying text.
50 106 S. Ct. at 2600.
51 Id
52 Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1983)); see also Sokm, 463 U.S. at
312-13 (Burger, CJ., joined by White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 264 (1972)(Brennan, J., concurring); McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971)(Black, J., concurring).
53 106 S. Ct. at 2600 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)(plurality
opinion)).
54 106 S. Ct. at 2600. See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)(plurality
opinion); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100 (plurality opinion)("the basic concept underly-
ing the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.").
55 See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-25 (1769); E. CORE, THIRD INSTITUTE 6
(6th ed. 1680); 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 35 (1736); 1 W.
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2 (7th ed. 1795);J. HAWLES, REMARKS
ON THE TRIAL OF MR. CHARLES BATEMAN, [1685] 11 How. ST. TR. *474, *477 (1816); see
infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
56 106 S. Ct. at 2601 (citing E. COKE, supra note 55).
57 Id. at 2600-01 (citing W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at *24-25).
58 Id. at 2601 (citing E. COKE, supra note 55).
59 Id. at 2601 (citingJ. HAWLES, supra note 55).
60 Id. at 2601 (citing W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at *395).
19861 851
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
tice Marshall noted the contemporary objection that the execution
of an insane person does not adequately serve society's need for
retribution.6
1
Justice Marshall summarized the commentators' views by de-
claring that while conflict exists among the various rationales ad-
vanced for the rule against the execution of the insane, almost no
authority exists counter to the rule.62 Furthermore, he noted that
authority suggests that early American courts imported the English
common law rule.63 Finally, Justice Marshall pointed out that no
state currently permits the execution of insane prisoners.64 Thus,
Justice Marshall stated that the common law rule "has as firm a hold
on the jurisprudence of today as it had centuries ago in England"
and concluded that the widespread acceptance of the rule com-
pelled the finding that the eighth amendment prohibits the execu-
tion of the insane.
65
61 Id. at 2601 (citing Hazard & Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution,
9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 387 (1962); see also Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of the Insanity Plea-
Clues to the Problems of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity in the Death Cell, 73 YALE L.J. 425,
433-41 (1964).
62 106 S. Ct. at 2601.
63 Id. (citing 1J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAw *761 (5th Am.
ed. 1847); 1 F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAw § 59 (8th ed. 1880)).
64 Forty-one of the 50 states have a death penalty. Of these, 26 states have statutes
which clearly require that the execution of a prisoner who is adjudged incompetent be
stayed. See ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4023 (1978); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 43-2622 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3703 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-8-112(2) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-101 (1982); FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-62 (1982); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 1005-2-3 (1982); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-4006(3) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.240(2) (1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 75(c) (Supp. 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57(2) (Supp. 1985); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 552.060 (Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221 (Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2537 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.445 (1985); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82 (West
1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-6 (1984); N.Y. CORRECT. LAw § 656 (McKinney Supp.
1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.29 (Baldwin
1979); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1008 (West 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-27A-24
(1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-13 (1982); Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-901 (Supp. 1986). Four
states have adopted the common law rule by judicial decision. See State v. Allen, 204 La.
513, 516, 15 So. 2d 870, 872 (1943); Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 22-23, 117
A.2d 96, 99 (1955); Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 89-90, 135 S.W. 327, 329 (1911);
State v. Davis, 6 Wash. 2d 696, 717, 108 P. 2d 641, 651 (1940). Seven states have discre-
tionary procedures whereby the prisoner will be transferred to a mental health facility
upon being found to suffer a mental illness. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 406 (1979);
IND. CODE § 11-10-4-2 (1982); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 279, § 62 (West 1985); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 40.1-5.3-7 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-220 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEx.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 46.01 (Vernon 1979); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-177 (1983).
Four states which have the death penalty do not have an explicit procedure governing
the insanity of condemned prisoners, but these states have not repudiated the common
law rule.
65 106 S. Ct. at 2602. It should be noted that Justice Marshall stated that the rule
forbids execution of the insane "[w]hether its aim be to protect the condemned from
852 [Vol. 77
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After reiterating that insane prisoners have a constitutional
right not to be executed, Justice Marshall stated that "[o]nce a sub-
stantive right or restriction is recognized in the Constitution ... its
enforcement is in no way confined to the rudimentary process
deemed adequate in ages past."66 Thus, Justice Marshall, who was
joined in the final sections of the opinion by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens, turned to the question of whether the Flor-
ida procedures for the determination of the competency of con-
demned prisoners fulfilled the due process required to protect a
constitutional right.
Justice Marshall first found that Alvin Ford was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing in federal court because the requirements of the
federal habeas corpus statute,67 as defined by the Court's ruling in
Townsend v. Sain,68 had not been met.69 In Townsend, the Court held
that "a federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the state-court
trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the relevant
facts."' 70 Because the Florida proceeding did not involve the partici-
pation of any state court, which is required by the federal statute,7'
Justice Marshall held that Ford was entitled to a de novo hearing on
the issue of his sanity. 7
2
Moreover, Justice Marshall examined whether Florida's proce-
dure provided the reliability required by Townsend and the federal
statute73 to avoid a federal evidentiary hearing in all cases involving
the Florida procedure. Justice Marshall found that Florida's proce-
dures were inadequate in three areas. First, the procedure failed to
allow the condemned prisoner to participate in the investigation of
his insanity. Specifically, Justice Marshall found the procedure to be
inadequate because Alvin Ford and his attorneys were not permitted
fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself
from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance .. " Id.
66 Id.
67 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
68 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
69 106 S. Ct. at 2603.
70 372 U.S. at 312-13.
71 One prerequisite to the denial of an evidentiary hearing is that there have been "a
determination after a hearing on the merits of the factual issue, made by a State court of
competent jurisdiction ...." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). See Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2603.
72 106 S. Ct. at 2603.
73 The various sections of § 2254 provide, inter alia, that an evidentiary hearing will
be required if: "the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate
to afford a full and fair hearing," § 2254(d)(2); "the material facts were not adequately
developed at the State court hearing," § 2254(d)(3); or "the applicant did not receive a




to submit information concerning his purported insanity.74 Second,
Justice Marshall found that Florida's procedure denied the prisoner
an opportunity to cross-examine the psychiatric panel appointed by
the state.75 Finally, Justice Marshall found that the Florida proce-
dure was inadequate because it rested the determination of the pris-
oner's insanity solely on an unreviewable decision by a member of
the same governmental branch that prosecuted the prisoner.
76
Although Justice Marshall clearly pointed out the problems
with the Florida procedure, he declined to identify a specific proce-
dure that would satisfy the requirements of due process. Justice
Marshall did suggest that states look for analogies in their own pro-
cedures for determining whether a defendant is competent to stand
trial or for determining whether a defendant can be involuntarily
commited to a mental health institution. 77 In addition, Justice Mar-
shall noted that some high threshold showing on behalf of the pris-
oner may be required to weed out nonmeritorious or repetitive
claims of insanity.78 Finally, Justice Marshall added that he did not
intend to suggest that a full trial on the insanity issue would be the
only way to satisfy due process. 79 Thus, Justice Marshall left the
burden on the states to develop constitutional procedures for han-
dling the insanity claims of death row inmates.
B. CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Powell agreed that the eighth amendment prohibits the
execution of the insane. Because he disagreed with Justice Mar-
shall's view of the required procedures for the disposition of in-
sanity claims, however, and felt that the issue of a standard for
determining insanity should have been addressed by the Court, Jus-
tice Powell wrote a separate concurrence.
80
74 Justice Marshall stated that "any procedure that precludes the prisoner or his
counsel from presenting material relevant to his sanity or bars consideration of that
material by the factfinder is necessarily inadequate." 106 S. Ct. at 2604. See also Ake v.
Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985) (due to the difficulty of diagnosing mental illness, the
factfinder must make his decision by evaluating the evidence presented by all parties);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976)(plurality opinion).
75 106 S. Ct. at 2605. In fact, the governor had a "publicly announced policy of
excluding all advocacy on the part of the condemned from the process of determining
whether a person under a sentence of death is insane." Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So.
2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1984).
76 106 S. Ct. at 2605. Justice Marshall stated that "[t]he commander of the State's
corps of prosecutors cannot be said to have the neutrality that is necessary for the relia-
bility in the factfinding proceeding." Id.
77 106 S. Ct. at 2606 n.4. See note 137 and accompanying text.
78 Id. at 2606.
79 Id. at 2605-06.
80 Id. at 2606 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Justice Powell first addressed the issue of the level of compe-
tency required before a prisoner could be executed. He stated that
the first justification for the rule exempting insane prisoners from
execution, that the prisoner's insanity might prevent him from mak-
ing arguments to defend himself, has little merit today8 l in light of
modern requirements for the effective assistance of counsel8 2 and
the requirement that a defendant be mentally competent at the time
of trial.83 Justice Powell, however, did find merit in the argument
that the execution of an insane person is inherently cruel because it
prevents him from mentally preparing for his death. He also stated
that such an execution interferes with the penal purpose of retribu-
tion since an insane person cannot comprehend the reason for his
execution.8 4 Thus,Justice Powell argued that the proper test of san-
ity in connection with the retributive purpose of criminal law is a
test of whether the defendant can understand the connection be-
tween his punishment and his crime.85
After reiterating the same argument set forth by Justice Mar-
shall as to the due process requirements of Townsend and the federal
habeas corpus statute,86 Justice Powell discussed the type of hearing
that he felt due process requires. Noting that the eighth amend-
ment issue arises only after a prisoner has been convicted and sen-
tenced, Justice Powell argued that the heightened due process
procedures required at trials and sentencing proceedings do not ap-
ply to the case of insanity pleas by condemned prisoners, especially
since the issue is merely when, rather than if, the prisoner is to be
executed.87 As a result, Justice Powell reasoned that the burden
should be on the petitioner, as it was at common law,8 8 to overcome
81 Id at 2607 (Powell, J., concurring).
82 See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). Justice Powell remarked that because the prisoner has an assurance of effective
counsel and the right of appeal, the common law concern that a prisoner will be wrongly
executed is very minimal today. 106 S. Ct. at 2607-08 (Powell, J., concurring).
83 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). Justice Powell apparently believes that
since a prisoner has a constitutional guarantee that he will not be tried if insane, his
concern that he be able to assist in his own defense is already met. 106 S. Ct. at 2608
(Powell, J., concurring).
84 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 61; Hazard & Louisell, supra note 61; see also Note, In-
sanity of the Condemned, 88 YALE LJ. 533, 533-36 (1979).
85 106 S. Ct. at 2605 (Powell, J., concurring). This test is the same one required by
the Florida procedure.
86 Justice Powell stated that Florida's procedure was inadequate because no determi-
nation by a court was required, information submitted by prisoners was not heard, and
the determination of sanity was made solely upon the examination of state appointed
psychiatrists. Id. at 2609 (Powell, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 2610 (Powell, J., concurring).
88 The Court in Nobles stated the common law rule that "'[e]very person of the age
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a rebuttable presumption of sanity.89 Thus, Justice Powell con-
cluded that a proceeding that is less formal than a trial would satisfy
due process concerns. 90 He would merely require that a state pro-
vide an impartial board or administrator to hear evidence and argu-
ment from the prisoner or his counsel.91
C. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
Contrary to the opinions of Justices Powell and Marshall, Jus-
tice O'Connor, joined by Justice White, concluded that the eighth
amendment does not prohibit the execution of the insane. 92 Jus-
tices O'Connor and White concurred in the judgment of the Court
because they felt that the Florida statute,93 mandating that a pris-
oner must be transferred to a mental health facility upon being
found to be insane, created an entitlement not to be executed while
insane. 94 In addition, Justice O'Connor stated that the Florida pro-
cedure violated due process because it did not afford the prisoner
his fundamental right to be heard.95
Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor argued that due process de-
mands should be reduced because the prisoner has already been
convicted and sentenced, and the opportunity for malingering and
calculated delay are great.96 Justice O'Connor stated that neither
of discretion is presumed of sane memory, until the contrary appears ......."Nobles, 168
U.S. at 408 (citations omitted).
89 In this context,Justice Powell correctly distinguishes Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418 (1979), where the Court held that for the involuntary commitment of an individual
(not necessarily a condemned convict) the state must show by clear and convincing
proof that the person is insane. 106 S. Ct. at 2610-11 (Powell, J., concurring).
90 Id. at 2611 (Powell, J., concurring).
91 Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
92 Id. at 2611 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor stated that she agreed with Justice Rehnquist that "the Due Process Clause
does not independently create a protected interest in avoiding the execution of a death
sentence during incompetency." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
93 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 922.07(3) (West Supp. 1986)
94 Id. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor stated that the Court's "cases leave no doubt that where a statute indicates
with 'language of an unmistakable and mandatory character,' that state conduct injuri-
ous to an individual will not occur 'absent specified substantive predicates,' the statute
creates an expectation protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. (O'ConnorJ, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part)(quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72
(1983)).
95 106 S. Ct. at 2612-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
fact, Justice O'Connor quoted the same language from Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385
(1914), as did Justices Marshall and Powell. In Grannis, the Court stated that "[tihe
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." Id. at 394.
96 The possibility for indefinite delay is great because no determination can ever be
conclusive, since the issue is present insanity. Justice O'Connor would argue that the
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oral argument nor cross-examination are necessary for a fair hear-
ing.97 In fact, Justice O'Connor would require that the deci-
sionmaker consider only the written submissions on behalf of the
prisoner.98 Thus, Justice O'Connor argued that "the Due Process
Clause imposes few requirements on the States in this context." 99
D. DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, agreed with
Justice O'Connor that due process requires only minimal protec-
tions for condemned prisoners. Justice Rehnquist and ChiefJustice
Burger dissented from the judgment of the Court, however, because
they believed that insane prisoners have no constitutional right to a
stay of execution. 10 0 Justice Rehnquist argued that the eighth
amendment does not confer any rights upon condemned prisoners
alleging present insanity. He criticized the Court's reliance on what
he considered a selective common law precedent, and stated that at
common law the decision whether to execute a prisoner purporting
to be insane was vested solely in the executive branch. 10 1
Justice Rehnquist suggested that Solesbee should control the is-
sue and militate against the adoption of an eighth amendment right,
particularly because the states' approach to determining con-
demned prisoners' sanity has not changed since Solesbee. 102 Further-
more, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with Justice O'Connor's
conclusion that Florida law created a right not to be executed while
insane, arguing instead that Florida's statutory procedure only cre-
ated a right to inform the Governor that the prisoner may be in-
sane. 0 3 Finally, Justice Rehnquist stressed the potential for abuse
state interest in carrying out its sentence makes this point crucial, and one that argues
for a reduction in the requirements of due process. See Nobles, 168 U.S. at 398.
97 106 S. Ct. at 2613 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99 Id. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100 Id. at 2614 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 2613 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(citing 1 N. WALKER, CRIME AND INsANrry IN
ENGLAND 194-203 (1968)); see also Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 11-12 (the power to pardon has
been vested almost solely in the executive branch).
102 106 S. Ct. at 2614 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
103 Id. (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist evidently believes that the expec-
tation that the Governor will hear a prisoner's claim is not the same as an expectation
that he will not be executed if insane. Nevertheless, if the prisoner is in fact insane (in
the mind of the Governor), the Florida statute requires that the Governor "shall have
him committed to a Department of Corrections mental health treatment facility." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 1985)(emphasis added). Thus, an expectation that the Gov-
ernor will hear a claim of insanity is really equivalent to an expectation that an insane
prisoner will not be executed because if the prisoner is in fact insane, the Governor
cannot order his execution.
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that the Court's new constitutional right created,10 4 ultimately con-
cluding that it was unnecessary to create a constitutional prohibition
against the execution of the insane because no state permitted such
an execution anyway.
V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The specific holding in Ford, that the petitioner was entitled to a
de novo evidentiary hearing in federal court, is well-grounded. Even
Justices O'Connor and White, who argued that insane prisoners do
not have an eighth amendment right to a stay of execution, agreed
with Justice Marshall and the majority that Florida's procedures did
not give Alvin Ford a "full and fair hearing."
10 5
Moreover, the majority's holding that the eighth amendment
prohibits the execution of the insane seems quite logical.' 06 Justice
Marshall's opinion correctly identified the two major factors of
eighth amendment analysis that the Court has considered in recent
years: basic human dignity and contemporary standards of de-
cency. 10 7 The unanimous acceptance of the rule against the execu-
tion of the insane by American courts and legislatures demonstrates
that the rule comports with our society's view of human dignity.'
08
In addition, the Court's acceptance of the rule follows logically from
the holding in Solem v. Helm,' 0 9 where the Court found that punish-
104 Justice Rehnquist noted that the new constitutional right "offers an invitation to
those who have nothing to lose by accepting it to advance entirely spurious claims of
insanity." 106 S. Ct. at 2615 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See infra note 120 and accompa-
nying text.
105 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
106 Ford's counsel also argued that the execution of the insane violates the eighth
amendment because it is excessive and serves no penological justification. See Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976). The argument contends that the only acceptable
penological justifications are retribution and deterrence, neither of which are served by
the execution of the insane. While it seems clear that the goal of retribution is frustrated
by the execution of the insane, see Ehrenzweig, supra note 61, at 434-40; Hazard & Loui-
sell, supra note 61, at 386-87, it can also be argued persuasively that Coke's view, that
execution of the insane has no deterrent value, is wrong. If one accepts the view that the
death penalty in general has a deterrent value, then the execution of the insane would
appear to have as much, or even more value, because it would be clear that not even
insanity would prevent those convicted of capital crimes from receiving the punishment
of death.
107 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 64; see'also Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Solesbee: "[N]ot a single
State gives any indication of having uprooted the heritage of the common law which
deemed it too barbarous to execute a man while insane." 339 U.S. at 22 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
109 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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ments considered cruel and unusual at common law are forbidden
by the eighth amendment."10
In short, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence supports the ma-
jority's eighth amendment analysis. Even Justice Rehnquist in dis-
sent could summon no better criticism of Justice Marshall's logic
than the argument that it is "unnecessary" to recognize a constitu-
tional right not to be executed because the rule is already uniformly
accepted." '
Prior to Ford, the Supreme Court had never before reached the
issue of whether the execution of insane persons is "cruel and unu-
sual punishment." Viewing the Court's previous cases in their most
limited sense, these cases hold only that if a prisoner does not have
a constitutional right to be spared from execution, he does not have
a right to a full jury trial upon a mere suggestion of insanity, and his
sanity can be determined exparte by either a governor or an adminis-
trative official. Thus, in one sense the holding in Ford is consistent
with the Court's prior decisions because those cases were decided
upon a premise that an insane prisoner had no constitutional right
to a stay of execution.
Nevertheless, the constitutional holding in Ford makes the
Court's previous cases somewhat obsolete. Due to the Court's
eighth amendment ruling, state procedures for dealing with claims
of insanity must now provide a much higher level of protection than
in the past, because, as Justice Frankfurter stated, "[I]n determining
what procedural safeguards a State must provide, it makes all the
difference in the world whether the United States Constitution
places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life
of an insane man."1 12 Even so, the reasoning in the Supreme
Court's prior opinions may still be of assistance in analyzing the is-
sue of the procedures that a state must employ in order to protect
the rights of condemned persons in its penal system.
B. PROCEDURES FOR THE DISPOSITION OF INSANITY CLAIMS
Although the majority in Ford left the task of determining what
procedures to use to deal with claims of insanity to the states, one
fact seems clear: a full jury trial is not required. The Court's deci-
sions prior to Ford demand such a conclusion, and even Justice Mar-
l 10 In Solem, the Court stated that "[ajlthough the Framers may have intended the
Eighth Amendment to go beyond the scope of its English counterpart, their use of the
language of the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof that they intended to provide
at least the same protection . . . ." Id at 286.
111 106 S. Ct. at 2615 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112 Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 15 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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shall conceded this point.113 Nonetheless, what proceedings are
required by due process is unclear after the Court's decision in Ford.
Justice Marshall apparently draws the line at requiring some
sort of adversary hearing, as unrestricted as possible, where the
prisoner would have the opportunity to present evidence in support
of his claim. 1 4 Justice Powell, on the other hand, would merely re-
quire that an impartial decisionmaker hear the claims of the pris-
oner. Justice O'Connor would mandate only that the prisoner's
submissions be considered. Thus, there seems to be a large area of
disagreement among the members of the Court over the type of
procedural safeguards that must be provided to a condemned in-
mate who makes a claim of mental incompetency.
Another instructive view of the procedures required by due
process can be gleaned from the opinions of Justice Frankfurter,
who was the first Supreme Court Justice to argue that the Constitu-
tion forbids the execution of the insane. Even thoughJustice Frank-
furter strongly supported the rights of allegedly insane death row
inmates, he would apparently not require a full trial or even a judi-
cial proceeding on the issue of present sanity.'" 5 Based upon his
dissent in Solesbee, Justice Frankfurter would apparently agree with
the view now held by Justices Powell and O'Connor, that lesser safe-
guards are required because the determination of sanity after sen-
tencing "does not go to the question of guilt but to its
consequences." ' "16 Thus, Justice Frankfurter suggested that an in
camera proceeding would satisfy due process requirements.
Still, Justice Frankfurter would require an opportunity for the
prisoner to be heard."17 He would mandate that the prisoner be
given the opportunity through counsel or next of kin to invoke the
protections of due process. He apparently would not support the
governor as the decisionmaker and receiver of evidence because of
113 106 S. Ct. at 2605-06 ("We do not here suggest that only a full trial on the issue of
sanity will suffice to protect the federal interests.").
114 Id. at 2605. Justice Powell evidently believes thatJustice Marshall would require a
"full-scale 'sanity trial.' " 106 S. Ct. at 2610 (Powell, J., concurring).
115 See Caritativo, 357 U.S. at 557 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)("I make no claim that
the Due Process Clause requires an opportunity to persons in the place of petitioners to
have their claim tested in a judicial proceeding."); Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 24 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) ("Since it does not go to the question of guilt but to its consequences, the
determination of the issue of insanity after sentence does not require the safeguards of a
judicial proceeding.").
116 Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
117 "[Tlhe minimum assurance that the life-and-death guess will be a truly informed
guess requires respect for the basic ingredient of due process, namely, an opportunity to
be allowed to substantiate a claim before it is rejected." Id. at 23 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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the potential for bias.' 18
Although various members of the Court have presented specific
ideas about the constraints of due process, in the end each state
must balance its own interests with those of the prisoners in its pe-
nal system.' 1 9 Certainly, the state has a very strong interest in
preventing the insanity claim from becoming a tool for the prisoner
to use to delay his execution. In fact, the fear of repeated insanity
claims was the primary factor that led the Court in Nobles to shy away
from giving a condemned prisoner the right to a jury trial on the
issue of insanity. 120 Moreover, a state may have a legitimate interest
in ensuring that its sentences are carried out 121 and in keeping the
administrative costs of its procedures to reasonable levels.
Nonetheless, now that insane condemned prisoners have a con-
stitutional right not to be executed, they cannot be deprived of this
right without due process of law. Considering the gravity of the de-
cision whether or not to grant a stay of execution, one could reason-
ably argue that the risk-of undue delay far outweighs the magnitude
of the insanity decision. Moreover, although the prisoner's interest
at this stage is far less compelling than his interest at trial or sen-
tencing because the prisoner has already been convicted and sen-
tenced to death, if the insane prisoner becomes permanently insane
then the issue again becomes whether he will be executed at all, not
merely when the execution will occur.
Despite the difficulties of harmonizing the competing interests
of the state with those of the individual prisoner, it is clear that the
118 There may be a tendency for a governor to exclude evidence offered by the pris-
oner because a "Governor might not want to have it on his conscience to have sent a
man to death after hearing conflicting views, equally persuasive, regarding the man's
sanity." Id at 25 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
119 It has been suggested that the three part balancing test proposed in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1975), should be used. See Note, supra, note 84 at 546-57. This
test identified the following factors: 1) the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the proce-
dures used; and, 3) the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
administrative and fiscal burdens of additional safeguards. 424 U.S. at 335.
120 The Court stated that
[i]f it were true that at common law a suggestion of insanity after sentence, created
on the part of a convict an absolute right to trial of this issue by a judge and jury,
then (as a finding that insanity did not exist at one time would not be the thing
adjudged as to its non-existence at another) it would be wholly at the will of a con-
vict to suffer any punishment whatever, for the necessity of his doing so would de-
pend solely upon his fecundity in making suggestion after suggestion of insanity, to
be followed by trial upon trial.
Nobles, 168 U.S. at 405-406.
121 "To protect itself society must have the power to try, convict, and execute
sentences. Our legal system demands that this governmental duty be performed with
scrupulous fairness to an accused." Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 13.
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common law procedures are no longer adequate. At common law,
no uniform procedure existed for handling claims of insanity by a
condemned prisoner. Rather, the trial judge had the discretion to
employ whatever procedures he felt were required under the cir-
cumstances. 22 Today, a condemned prisoner has a right to greater
assurance than this. In order to provide these assurances, every
state must develop four specific sets of procedures.
First, the state must establish a procedure for raising a claim of
insanity. 123 Some states allow anyone to raise the issue of insanity,
while others allow only a warden or sheriff keeping the inmate in
custody to raise the issue.124 For a prisoner's first claim of incompe-
tency, at least, he should be permitted one hearing as a matter of
right.
Second, a specific type of hearing for dealing with a properly
raised claim of insanity should be identified. The prisoner must be
given the opportunity to be heard and his evidence must be received
by the decision making authority. A full trial is not required, how-
ever, because this hearing does not involve a question of guilt or
innocence. Moreover, a jury is unnecessary because expert testi-
mony will probably be dispositive, especially considering that juries
are likely to accept the judgments of court-appointed experts.
125
The decisionmaker should not be the governor 126 because of his po-
tential for bias.127 An impartial authority that would hear evidence
supplied by a panel of experts would probably suffice. 128 In addi-
tion, the prisoner through counsel should have the opportunity to
challenge the findings of the state experts.
Third, the state must designate a procedure for the disposition
of repeated claims of insanity. As Justice Marshall alluded to, a rea-
122 See Nobles, 168 U.S. at 407.
123 There are alternative approaches to a formal sanity hearing. See Weihofen, A Ques-
tion ofJustice: Trial or Execution of an Insane Defendant, 37 A.B.AJ. 651 (1951). One option
is the enactment of a law that would require that all prisoners alleging insanity be com-
mitted to a mental hospital for observation. A different approach would be to enact a
rule such as that adopted by Massachusetts which requires routine pyschiatric examina-
tions of all persons convicted of major offenses. Id. at 654.
124 H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 465-66 (1954).
125 The following statistics are set forth in an article by Henry Weihofen: In Ohio
from 1929 to 1949, the findings in the hospital report were rejected only three times in
894 cases. In Maine, over a thirty year period the state hospital's findings were rejected
only once in 208 cases. Weihofen, supra note 123, at 710.
126 Justice Marshall argued vehemently that the governor should not make the final
decision concerning the claim of insanity. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Jus-
tice Frankfurter apparently felt the same way. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
127 The decision should not be made by a prison warden or hospital administrator for
the same reason.
128 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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sonable threshold must be employed to weed out nonmeritorious
claims. Expedited review after an initial full hearing may be a good
alternative.129 However, because the issue involved here is present
incompetency, the prisoner must not be dismissed without a thor-
ough reevaluation of his case, even though this may cause adminis-
trative burdens. °3 0 Thus, a high threshold requirement for a
hearing may be necessary since successive hearings cannot be
rudimentary.
Finally, the state must develop a procedure to determine when
a prisoner has returned to sanity. While this issue has receive little
attention, it is significant because the determination that a prisoner
has regained his sanity means that he is again condemned to die.
Rather than an act of mercy, the finding that a condemned prisoner
is sane actually represents his death warrant. Moreover, the proce-
dures for determining whether a prisoner has regained his sanity
should be more stringent than for the initial determination of
mental competency, because in the former case the prisoner is ex-
amined against a background of a legal insanity, while in the latter
case the prisoner's background is that he was already found compe-
tent to be tried and sentenced. Therefore, neither an expedited
hearing nor a procedure leaving the sanity decision solely to a hos-
pital administrator would adequately protect the prisoner's due pro-
cess rights.
C. THE TEST OF INSANITY
The test of insanity used to determine whether a prisoner is fit
to be executed is a crucial element in the procedures discussed
above. The generally accepted common law test for insanity is
whether the defendant is aware of his conviction and his impending
execution,' 3 ' although it has also been forumulated as a question of
whether the condemned has the "present mental competency to un-
derstand the nature and purpose of the punishment to be executed
upon him."' 3 2 No matter which test represents the common law
view, however, it seems clear that there must be a more explicit ar-
129 See supra text accompanying note 77.
130 The Court in Nobles was also hesitant to recognize a right to a jury trial because it
felt that "[i]f the right of trial by jury exist at all, it must exist at all times, no matter how
often the plea is repeated alleging insanity occurring since the last verdict." Nobles, 168
U.S. at 407 (quoting Laros v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 200, 211 (1877)).
131 Hazard & Louisell, supra note 61, at 394 n.44 (citing Commonwealth v. Moon, 383
Pa. 18, 117 A.2d 96 (1955)); cf. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1619 (1961)(citing In re Smith,
25 N.M. 48, 59, 176 P. 819, 823 (1918)). See also supra note 135.
132 H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 124, at 466.
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ticulation of the rule behind the test in order to give a condemned
prisoner a fair hearing on his claim of insanity.
Virtually all of the commentators 133 who have examined the is-
sue have have agreed that the test for insanity should be tailored to
the purposes of the rule. For example, if the reason for the rule
against executing the insane is to ensure that the condemned pris-
oner has every opportunity to explain why he should not be exe-
cuted, then the test of insanity should be whether the prisoner has
the faculties to think of such a reason and the ability to communi-
cate it to a lawyer. If, however, the purpose of the rule is to let the
condemned make his peace with God, then recognition of the moral
reprehensiveness of the crime that was committed should be the de-
cisive factor.134 Alternatively, if the rationale for the rule is that "he
who sins must suffer," then the prisoner must be able to appreciate
his impending fate.
Some formulations of a test of insanity have implicitly ad-
dressed this problem. For example, the test advocated by Justice
Frankfurter focuses on the prisoner's ability to defend himself by
being capable of submitting reasons why he should not be exe-
cuted. 135 Justice Powell, on the other hand, apparently does not be-
lieve there is a need to include the ability of the prisoner to assist in
his own defense because there are enough other procedural safe-
guards available to address that concern. 13 6 He would require the
defendant to be aware of his punishment and the reason for it, as
133 See M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 433-41 (1952); H.
WEIHOFEN, supra note 124, at 463-70; Ehrenzweig, supra note 61, at 440; Hazard & Loui-
sell, supra note 61, at 394-95; Comment, Execution of Insane Persons, 23 S. CAL. L. REv.
246, 256 (1950); Note, supra note 84, at 561-62. But cf. Note, The Eighth Amendment and
the Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1980).
134 This test "would have absolutely nothing to do with whether he can distinguish
right from wrong, whether he can act according to this knowledge, or whether he suffers
from a mental disease; or with any other formulation of the insanity test devised for the
determination of criminal responsibility." Ehrenzweig, supra note 61, at 440.
135 After sentence of death, the test of insanity is whether the prisoner has not "from
the defects of his faculties, sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the pro-
ceedings against him, what he was tried for, the purpose of his punishment, the impend-
ing fate which awaits him, a sufficient understanding to know any fact which might exist
which would make his punishment unjust or unlawful, and the intelligence requisite to
convey such information to his attorneys or the court."
Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 20 n.3 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)(quoting In re Smith, 25 N.M. 48,
59, 176 P. 819, 823 (1918)). See also Annotation, Insanity Supervening After Conviction and
Sentence of Death, 49 A.L.R. 804 (1927).
136 Justice Powell argued that because no prisoner can be tried who is not sane, and
because all prisoners have the right to effective assistance of counsel and the benefit of
collateral review, the likelihood that a prisoner would be executed while there existed an
unfound error is minimal. 106 S. Ct. at 2608 (Powell, J., concurring).
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such a test would satisfy the retributive goal of punishment and al-
low the prisoner to prepare himself for his death.
One pair of commentators has suggested that the appropriate
test should be the same as that used for involuntary commitment to
a mental institution, 13 7 because this test is relatively easy to use and
familiar to judges and psychiatrists. 13  Whatever test is adopted by
a state, it must be in accord with the purpose of the rule against the
execution of the insane.
D. THE LOGIC OF THE RULE
The Supreme Court committed a major error in Ford by not
explicitly identifying the accepted justification for the rule against
the execution of the insane. Although Justice Marshall stated that
the rule applies as much today as it did at common law, he did not
examine the logical force of the proposed justifications for the rule,
all but one of which are somewhat dubious. For example, the argu-
ment that executing an insane person has no deterrent value is
questionable because those who supposedly would be deterred by
the death penalty could not envision themselves becoming insane
after being tried and sentenced. 139 In fact, the knowledge that even
insanity will not prevent one who commits a capital offense from
suffering execution might increase the in terrorem effect of the death
penalty. 14
0
Similarly, the reasoning that executing an insane person vio-
lates humanity is also flawed. Justice Traynor, of the California
Supreme Court, stated his dissatisfaction with this rationale in his
concurrence in the lower court remand of Phyle v. Duly:14 1
Is it not an inverted humanitarianism that deplores as barbarous the
capital punishment of those who have become insane after trial and
conviction, but accepts the capital punishment for sane men, a curious
reasoning that would free a man from capital punishment only if he is
137 The commentators would use this test, rather than one tailored to an accepted
justification for the rule against the execution of the insane, because they concluded that
the only acceptable explanation for the rule is that it avoids the unnecessary taking of
life. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 61, at 395.
138 The commentators pointed out that this test keeps the investigation "in the realm
of medical discourse" rather than involving psychiatrists in the interpretation of legal
standards. Id
139 Id. at 385. Because the offender cannot foresee that he will become insane, "he
neither supposes he will not be caught or is indifferent to the consequences if he is.
Hence, it does not materially dilute the deterrent effect of the death penalty to withhold
it if the prisoner becomes insane." Id.
140 See M. GUTrMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 133, at 437.
141 34 Cal. 2d 144, 154, 208 P.2d 668, 674 (1949)(Traynor,J., concurring).
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not in full possession of his senses? 142
Moreover, staying the execution of an insane death row inmate be-
cause insanity itself is sufficient punishment, ignores the reality that
he will be executed as soon as he returns to sanity.1
43
In short, the rule against the execution of the insane can be
plausibly justified only by accepting that the execution of an insane
person has less retributive value than the execution of a person who
is fully aware of the fate he faces. 144 If retribution provides an ac-
ceptable reason for imposing capital punishment, the rule adopted
by the Court makes sense. Otherwise, the rule against the execution
of the presently insane only makes the death penalty appear to be
arbitrary and capricious. The lack of an accepted justification for
the rule, at a minimum, causes significant problems because it
makes the determination of the appropriate test of supervening in-
sanity a difficult, if not futile, task.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the reasoning of the plurality in Ford v. Wainwright
makes sense in light of the Supreme Court's recent interpretations
of the eighth amendment, the decision is deficient in three ways.
The Court neglected to identify what procedures states must use for
dealing with the insanity claims of condemned prisoners. Moreover,
the Court failed to identify a test of mental fitness to be executed.
Finally, the Court erred by not specifying which rationale it accepted
for the rule against the execution of the insane. Nonetheless, the
holding at least begins to safeguard the rights of prisoners who until
now were dependent upon the mercy of the state.
SANFORD M. PASTROFF
142 Id. at 158, 208 P.2d at 676-77 (Traynor, J., concurring).
143 See Hazard & Louisell, supra note 61, at 384.
144 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 61, at 434-39; see also Hazard & Louisell, supra note 61,
at 386-87. A frequently cited judicial elaboration of this concept is that "[a]mid the
darkened mists of mental collapse, there is no light against which the shadows of death
may be cast. It is revealed that if [the insane prisoner] were taken to the electric chair,
he would not quail or take account of its significance." Musselwhite v. State, 215 Miss.
363, 367, 60 So. 2d 807, 809 (1952).
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